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Abstract 
Pension reforms are on the political agenda of many countries. Such reforms imply 
an increasing responsibility on individuals’ side in building an efficient portfolio for 
retirement. In this paper we provide a model describing workers’ choices on the 
allocation of retirement savings in presence of a) mandatory pension contribution; b) 
different pension plans; c) information costs and financial literacy investment 
decisions. In particular, we characterise the results from both a positive and 
normative standpoint, by highlighting the determinants of individuals’ choice, with 
special focus on information costs, on the role of income and preferences, and by 
characterizing the optimal contribution rate to mandatory complementary pension 
plans. We also introduce endogenous financial literacy and analyse how its optimal 
level is determined and how it affects the decisions on pension plans. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades pension systems of both developed and developing economies have been undergoing 
major reforms. Broadly speaking, such reforms rely on considerations which descend from the “optimal 
portfolio theory”: in presence of assets whose risks are not completely correlated, differentiation of a 
portfolio over different assets can generate a more efficient investment than investing in a single asset. 
Among the common features of the aforementioned reforms there is the possibility given to workers to 
choose how to invest a fixed part of their retirement savings between different opportunities. This is 
particularly true, for example, for Australia, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom where a 
certain share of pension contributions can be directed towards alternative plans/schemes (usually called 
second pillar or complementary social security) but also for Argentina and Peru where mixed private/public 
schemes are present and workers are called to choose between them. Even New Zealand and US somehow 
fall in this category as the KiwiSavers and 401k plan, respectively, can be considered a possible option in 
which to invest retirement savings. Moreover, several countries undergoing important pension reforms (for 
example Hungary, Poland and Uruguay) have given workers the possibility to choose between the old and 
new system. Finally, on the extreme edge, there is Mexico whose whole pension system is run by private 
companies so that workers have directly to choose between alternative pension funds. In all these cases 
individuals have some degree of choice on how to invest part of their mandatory contribution. 
A more detailed description of the pension systems of some of the countries mentioned above and of the 
dimension of the compulsory savings over which individuals have some degree of choice is summarized in 
Table 1. Given the working of the systems described in the table, we can say that, even if the alternatives 
provided to workers are different from country to country, there is a common trend in recent reforms that 
entails increasing responsibility on the workers’ side in building up an adequate portfolio for facing 
retirement needs. 
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In this new scenario, the issue of obtaining an adequate degree of information and financial literacy has 4 
been raised by several researchers, in that the choice of both the amount and the composition of the 5 
retirement-saving-portfolio implies the understanding and the evaluation of the different opportunities that 6 
are now offered. However, although several papers have produced a solid piece of evidence on the relevance 7 
of financial literacy in determining the “planning attitude” or the degree of farsightedness of individuals1, to 8 
                                                 
1The literature on financial literacy has stressed the importance of this factor in the financial decisions of individuals and in particular 
in saving behaviour and retirement decisions (for an overview of this issue see OECD 2005). Most works on this subject approach 
the issue from a behavioural perspective or through empirical analyses: Clark et al. (2003) compare questionnaires about retirement 
goals filled by the same individuals before and after attending a financial seminar and note how retirement decisions change after 
such an event. Lusardi and Mitchel (2009) perform an analysis with an American dataset containing detailed information of both the 
Table 1: Complementary social security around the world: some examples of pension systems entailing 
freedom of choice and mandatory contribution 
 Fixed amount of 
mandatory 
savings with 
some degree of 
choice (share of 
total earnings) 
Workers’ options Presence of 
further 
mandatory 
savings with 
no degree of 
choice 
Notes 
Argentina 11% 
DB plan run by the public or DC 
private pension funds. 
Yes 
The possibility to choose 
ended in 2009. 
Australia 9% 
Several pension plans run by 
private pension funds. 
No  
Hungary 33.5% 
Choice between old DB* system 
and new mixed DB/DC system. 
No 
The choice had to be done in 
1998 and it  applied only to 
individuals that were already 
working at the time 
Mexico 
11.5% plus extra 
savings depending on 
wage bracket. 
Several pension plans run by 
private pension funds. 
No  
Netherlands Usually around 16% 
Several pension plans run by 
occupational pension funds. 
Yes 
Contribution to occupational 
plans is quasi-mandatory 
being compulsory for 90% 
of workers. 
New Zealand 4% or 8% 
Several pension plans run by 
private pension funds. 
No 
Can choose to opt out from 
mandatory contribution 
Norway 
Depends on employer, 
but minimum is 2% 
Several pension plans run by 
occupational pension funds. 
Yes  
Peru 13% 
Choice between a public pension 
and private pension funds. 
No  
Poland 19.52% 
Choice between old DB system 
and new NDC system. 
No 
The choice had to be done in 
1999 and it only applied to 
individuals born between 
1949 and 1968 
Sweden 2.5% 
Several pension plans run by 
private and public pension funds. 
Yes  
UK** Usually around 6% 
DB plan run by the state or 
occupational pension funds. 
Yes  
United States 
No fixed amount (but 
has absolute upper 
thresholds) 
Employers offer several pension 
plans run by private pension 
funds.  
Yes  
Uruguay 7.5% 
Several pension plans run by 
private and public pension funds. 
Yes  
*DB: definite benefit; DC: definite contribution. ** The British pension system is currently undergoing some changes following 
the introduction of the 2011 Pension Bill. According to this reform, employees will still retain the right to choose where to invest 
a certain share of their income and in addition, a further share will be automatically invested in an occupational fund unless the 
employee opts-out. Since the details of this latter mechanism have not been fully established at the time of the writing, we 
decided to report in the table only the mandatory components that were already present. 
 
Sources:  The information provided in the table was obtained from SSA (2010a), SSA (2010b) and OECD (2011). 
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the best of our a knowledge scarce effort has been put on the theoretical analysis of the effects that the cost 1 
of achieving such an adequate level of information and financial knowledge can play in determining 2 
workers’ optimal decisions. A notable exception is the model worked out by Jappelli and Padula (2011) 3 
where the degree of financial literacy determines the returns of saving: given that financial literacy is costly, 4 
the authors use their model to determine the optimal investment in literacy and to assess how this mechanism 5 
affects saving behaviour. Their paper however does not analyse the role of literacy on the choice between 6 
different investment plans and, moreover, they build a model where returns are non-stochastic: these are two 7 
aspects that will be crucial in our contribution. Also Lusardi et al (2011) explore the issue of optimal 8 
financial literacy and they develop a numerically-simulated life cycle model where endogenous financial 9 
literacy affects the stochastic returns from saving and where exogenous education determines income. 10 
Given these premises, in this paper we aim at exploring how the existence of a cost to achieve the 11 
necessary degree of information to understand and access an investment plan can affect the distribution of 12 
investment decisions in the population and how it interacts with the wage level, preferences of different 13 
individuals and financial literacy investment decisions. 14 
More precisely, the scope of the present paper is twofold: on one hand, to build a model describing the 15 
determinants of individuals’ decisions on the amount and the allocation of retirement saving in presence of a) 16 
mandatory contribution; b) the opportunity of investing the mandatory contribution in plans involving 17 
different interest rates and volatility; c) information costs to access the more complex plans and d) a 18 
relationship between these costs and financial literacy. On the other hand, to provide a normative analysis of 19 
the optimal contribution rate that public authority should set. 20 
 21 
 22 
1.1 Previous related literature 23 
Our paper has much to do with previous literature on overlapping generation models dealing with 24 
consumption and retirement saving in the presence of public pensions (for example, Samuelson 1958 and 25 
1975 or Blake 2006 for a broader overview), although the presence of uncertain returns from pension plans 26 
makes our case different from the basic ones. Some articles have analysed pension systems where saving 27 
decisions are taken under some degree of uncertainty: Demange (2009), for example, builds an overlapping 28 
generation model with macro shocks and assesses the political support by new generations to different rates 29 
of contribution and intergenerational risk sharing; D’Amato and Galasso (2010) use an overlapping 30 
generation model with shocks on aggregate production to compare the optimal and the politically feasible 31 
level of intergenerational risk sharing. Somehow differently, Maurer et al. (2010) perform an empirical 32 
analysis of the effect of uncertainty in labour income on the life-cycle portfolios. Similarly to Gordon and 33 
Varian (1988), we model directly the uncertainty from the returns on retirement savings. However we depart 34 
from this work in that we do not focus on intergenerational risk sharing2 and we allow for voluntary savings 35 
to be optimally chosen and for the existence of different investment opportunities. 36 
More recently, a number of studies have analysed the consequences of stochastic returns from retirement 37 
savings and their consequences on the optimal portfolio composition. Wagener (2003) builds a model where 38 
voluntary savings are chosen optimally and they coexist with compulsory retirement savings: both forms of 39 
savings yield stochastic returns and the model is used to compare fixed contribution to fixed retribution 40 
pension systems. An even more portfolio oriented3 approach is contained in Dutta et al. (2000) where they 41 
derive, under a mean-variance utility function, the optimal allocation of exogenously determined retirement 42 
savings between funded and unfunded pension plans/schemes: the two plans display different stochastic 43 
returns and the optimal allocation is obtained under the assumption that no other form of saving is present.  44 
Also Matsen and Thogersen (2004) adopt a portfolio approach and build a model where a given amount of 45 
saving has to be allocated between risky and safe assets given that a share of individuals’ saving is forcedly 46 
invested in funded and unfunded PAYG pension plans: the authors derive thus the optimal allocation of 47 
                                                                                                                                                                  
retirement planning decisions and financial knowledge of individuals and find a strong influence of the latter. Still on the American 
case, but with a different database, Lusardi and Mitchel (2011) analyse how the lack of financial literacy is particularly relevant in 
the decision of some categories of individuals while Fornero and Monticone (2011) explore this issue for Italy finding evidence that 
financial literacy is usually scarce and that participation to pension plans in general and to riskier options in particular, is significantly 
influenced by it.   
2 Related to the Gordon and Varian (1988) work on intergenerational risk sharing is Veall (1986). 
3 Clearly, some classic works like Phelps (1962), Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) have analysed optimal portfolio decision 
under uncertain returns, however, they did not focus on retirement savings nor on fixed contribution rates nor on the possibility of 
choosing between alternative schemes. 
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voluntary savings as well as the optimal dimension and composition of the PAYG system. De Menil et al. 1 
(2006) develop a normative analysis to determine the optimal balance between current consumption, 2 
voluntary funded saving and compulsory retirement saving, where returns from both forms of savings are 3 
stochastic but only a single pension plan exists. Finally, Corsini et al. (2012) argue that choices on pension 4 
plans can affect workers’ career, such that, in turn, the latter effect can play a role in their very decisions. 5 
Our work focuses on the agents’ choice of a single pension plan among different alternatives and it 6 
explores this choice process both from a positive and normative perspective. Our model determines the 7 
optimal portfolio composition of retirement-savings, so that it shares some features with Dutta et al. (2000) 8 
and Matsen and Thorgsen (2004) but we crucially depart from these works by allowing for consumption to 9 
be optimally determined, for the presence of information costs, financial literacy and wage heterogeneity. On 10 
the other hand, for the sake of tractability, we assume that returns from voluntary savings are not stochastic, 11 
though we discuss how to relax this assumption in the normative part of our analysis. 12 
Empirical analyses have also explored the determinants of investments in assets with uncertain returns. 13 
While not directly tackling the issue of planning for retirement, the analyses by Bertaut and Haliassos (1995), 14 
Christiansen et al. (2007) and van Rooij et al. (2011) highlight how risky assets are usually chosen by 15 
individuals with higher income and higher financial literacy. In particular Bertaut and Haliassos (1995) 16 
suggest how their evidence can be explained, among others, by the presence of some information costs that 17 
are associated to riskier and more complex assets. The role of complexity also emerges in Iyengar et al. 18 
(2004) where the authors, using data concerning the 401k plan participation in the US, show that providing 19 
individuals with too many choice options on the specific characteristics of the plan may lead to lower 20 
motivation towards the optimal choice so that complexity does affect the final choice. Moreover, the authors 21 
argue that workers’ wide opportunity set can create a burden for workers that is related to the time lost in 22 
keeping track of the different options.  23 
Following these contributions, in our model we allow for the presence of a cost that has to be paid in 24 
order to obtain the information to fully understand and assess an investment plan. We call this an 25 
“information cost” and it must be paid to access a given plan. This cost can have a component that is related 26 
to the time lost to fully understand the plan (i.e. it is an opportunity cost, as also suggested by Bertaut and 27 
Haliassos 1995 and Iyengar et al. 2004) and is related to the complexity of the plan (so that it can be assumed 28 
to be zero for simpler/safer investment plans) and, possibly, on the degree of financial literacy of individuals. 29 
Some of the results we provide are expected: expected rate of returns and volatility have an important 30 
role in the attractiveness of the plans, and similarly, higher risk aversion (propensity) of the individuals 31 
pushes the favour toward a safer (riskier) option.  32 
Some results are less obvious: first, we show that the role of wages in affecting the portfolio decision can 33 
be, in principle, non-monotonic and it depends on the shape of information costs, on the level of contribution 34 
rate and on the individuals’ attitude towards risk. Second, we show that the role of income is clear-cut and in 35 
line with the above cited empirical findings under non-increasing relative risk aversion: if this is the case, 36 
then the cost necessary to achieve an adequate degree of financial knowledge typically discourages low 37 
income workers from opting for more complex plans. Third, we characterize the optimal contribution rate to 38 
complementary pension plans and we show that it crucially depends on the degree of attractiveness of the 39 
pension plan and on the degree of risk aversion: more precisely, it is an increasing (decreasing) function of 40 
wage if relative risk aversion is decreasing (increasing). Finally, following Jappelli and Padula (2011) and 41 
Lusardi et al (2011) we also provide a framework in which financial literacy is endogenously chosen by 42 
individuals: in particular, we imagine that individuals can invest in financial literacy and, differently from the 43 
latter contributions we assume that this investment allows to reduce the information cost to access the 44 
complex plan. By introducing this new assumption we are also able to obtain an optimal level of financial 45 
literacy and we show that, among others, it is an increasing function of wage. 46 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: after reviewing the literature related to our work, in section 47 
2 we build a model of optimal consumption and saving in the presence of a mandatory pension plan with 48 
stochastic returns and, in section 3, we allow for alternative investment opportunities, some of which entail 49 
information costs, and examine the determinants of workers’ decision, by focusing on the role of wages in 50 
section 4; moreover, in section 5 we discuss the role of the mandatory contribution rate and then we carry out 51 
a normative analysis which allows us to determine the optimal level of such a contribution rate. In section 6 52 
we extend our model in order to deal with more sophisticated preferences and with endogenously determined 53 
financial literacy. As for the former, we introduce decreasing risk aversion and, as for the latter, we allow for 54 
variable amount of financial literacy investment that directly reduces information costs. Finally, in section 7 55 
we conclude. 56 
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 1 
 2 
2. Consumption and saving in the presence of mandatory complementary pension plans 3 
 4 
We imagine a small closed economy where individuals live two periods: in the first period they work and 5 
consume part of their income, given by wage w, whereas in the second they consume what they have saved. 6 
In particular, savings are partly voluntary and partly compulsory: for the sake of simplicity we assume that 7 
voluntary saving is accumulated at the safe rate r4. As for the compulsory component, for the sake of 8 
simplicity, we omit the existence of a mandatory PAYG pension scheme5 and we assume that workers have 9 
to adhere to a complementary pension plan i (which is usually referred to as the second pillar) where they 10 
must invest a fixed share of their income. The exact rate of compulsory contribution   is fixed by law and 11 
the plan i yields stochastic returns ri that are drawn from a normal distribution, so that  2,~ iii rNr  , where 12 
ir  and 
2
i  are, respectively, mean and variance of the returns. Some plans may display a zero variance so 13 
that they yield fixed returns and are equivalent to investing in a safe asset. In addition, workers have to pay a 14 
cost Ci (which in some cases can be zero) to access the i plan. This is an information cost and it depends on 15 
the complexity of the mechanism governing the plan and to the effort needed to keep track of the 16 
performance of the asset. This cost can be seen as the cost necessary to obtain enough information to fully 17 
understand and assess the plan and from this point of view it could be related to the financial literacy of 18 
workers: this relationship with literacy will be better covered in section 6. To all extents, these information 19 
costs reduce the desirability of the plan.  20 
Given the above discussion we can write down the following budget constraint: 21 
 22 
     ii rwrCcwc  111 12          (1) 23 
 24 
where c1 and c2 represent consumption in the first and second period respectively. Given that ir  is a 25 
random variable, c2 is stochastic and is actually normally distributed6.  26 
Workers lifetime utility U is a function on the consumption in the two periods so that   21,ccUU  , 27 
where monotonicity and concavity on consumption are assumed. Workers choose how much to consume 28 
(and thus to save) in the first period aiming to obtain the highest expected utility (denoted as   21,ccUE ); 29 
the problem they face is then 30 
 31 
  
     
 





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
0,..
,1~..
,max
21
222
12
21
1
cEcts
wrrwrCcwNcts
ccUE
iii
c
 .      (2) 32 
 33 
The first constraint represents the budget constraint from eq. (1) while the second constraint implies that 34 
individuals cannot choose a negative consumption in the first period and that they cannot borrow an amount 35 
greater than what they can, on average, give back in the second period7. 36 
From an analytical point of view, the above problem is not trivial as it requires the computation of the 37 
expected utility of a gamble (concerning the realization of consumption in the second period, in our case). To 38 
obtain a closed form solution we assume that lifetime utility takes the following form: 39 
 40 
21 acac eeU
              (3) 41 
                                                 
4 In any case, we discuss in section 5 how this simplifying assumption is not crucial for the normative analysis. 
5 In fact, typically individuals have no degree of choice on the investment of such component (usually called first pillar) and its 
inclusion in the model would not alter our results. 
6 Since we are assuming normality of returns we cannot exclude the possibility of a negative realization of consumption in the second 
period. However, this is an extreme possibility that happens with probability almost (but not) zero. In this extreme case we may 
interpret the negativity of consumption imagining that the individuals have to cover the losses with some extra work in the second 
period, which, for simplicity, we assimilate to a negative consumption. 
7 Since individuals prefer to smooth consumption and have no labour income in the second period, borrowing will take place only for 
extremely high rates of compulsory contribution. 
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 1 
where ]1,0( is the intertemporal discount factor and 0a  is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion 2 
and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) is thus implied. In section 6 we will extend the model to allow 3 
for variable risk aversion. 4 
We can solve the above using a property 8  of exponential utility functions: in fact, for any given 5 
stochastic variable zj distributed normally with mean z and variance 
2
z we have that 
 2/2
)( zj
azaaz
eeE
  . 6 
Since in our case consumption in the second period is normally distributed we can exploit this property and 7 
obtain 8 
 9 
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       (4) 10 
 11 
where 2c and 
2
2c
 are, respectively, mean and variance of consumption in the second period. From the 12 
solution of the above we obtain9 the following optimal consumption (
*
,1 ic  and
*
,2 ic ): 13 
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x
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 17 
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 19 
where x=1+r, 
w
C
x
awrr
d iiii 


2/
2

 . Eq. (5c) describes the indirect expected utility of a 20 
worker under the plan i. The above equations refer to the inner solution of the maximisation problem and 21 
they arise as long as the following condition holds: 22 
 23 
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 25 
Since the analysis of the corner solutions is beyond the scope of the present paper, (for a study of this 26 
issue see Corsini and Spataro 2012), in the rest of the paper, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 27 
above condition holds true, so that the interiority of solutions is always satisfied. 28 
 29 
 30 
3. Choosing between alternative plans 31 
 32 
We analyse now how workers behave when they are given the possibility to choose between different 33 
complementary pension plans (or schemes). In particular we imagine that workers can choose between two 34 
possible plans: a safe plan and a risky plan. The fact that individuals have to strictly choose between different 35 
plans without the possibility of mixing them appears to be the most realistic case as we have described in 36 
Table 1. However, in section 5, we discuss how the possibility of mixing plans would affect our model. 37 
If workers are given the possibility to choose between two schemes they will typically proceed in two 38 
steps: first they will choose which scheme to adhere to and then they will choose consumption and saving so 39 
                                                 
8 This is a well-known result: see Varian (1993). Note also that our approach is equivalent to the use of a mean/variance utility 
function as is done, among others, by D’Amato and Galasso (2010). 
9 See Appendix A for the algebraic derivations. 
 7 
as to maximise their expected utility. As a solution strategy we solve the problem through backward 1 
induction: we start from the last step, where workers determine their indirect utility (through optimal 2 
consumption and voluntary saving) in a given plan i (which is given by (5c)) and then we go back to the first 3 
step where workers choose the plan that yields the highest indirect utility, in which investing their 4 
compulsory savings. 5 
 6 
 7 
3.1. Safe plan 8 
 9 
We imagine that the safe plan S yields a certain return rS with zero variance. For simplicity, and without 10 
loss of generality, we assume that the returns of this plan are the same as those on voluntary saving so that 11 
 0,~ rNrS . Moreover, given the simplicity of this plan, we assume that no information costs have to be 12 
paid to access and understand it so that 0SC . Given the characteristics in terms of returns and costs of this 13 
plan it descends that 0Sd  and the solutions in eq. (5a)-(5c) take the following form: 14 
 15 
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 21 
Note that consumption10 in both periods is a deterministic variable. 22 
 23 
3.2. Risky plan 24 
 25 
Under the risky plan workers obtain returns rR which are drawn from a distribution  2,~ RRR rNr   where 26 
Rr and 
2
R  are mean and variance respectively. Given the risky nature of this plan we assume that rrR  : in 27 
fact if the latter inequality does not hold, such a plan would be clearly unattractive and all (risk averse) 28 
workers would simply choose the safe plan.   29 
We also assume that in this plan CR>0, implying that a certain amount of information costs has to be 30 
paid to access it. This is partly a direct fixed cost (for example the price of informative material or the fee to 31 
attend a course on finance) and partly an opportunity cost (related to the time lost to understand and to keep 32 
track of the plan). In particular, we assume wfFCR   where 0F is the fixed component and 33 
0wf  is the opportunity cost component which is then related to worker’s wage/income.11  34 
In the analysis we cover only the case 0f because, within our framework, the variable component is 35 
due, if present, to opportunity costs. However, it is possible that higher income is also correlated to better 36 
financial knowledge and literacy and therefore, information costs could be less relevant for richer workers. In 37 
this section we assume that, for a given income, these costs are the same for all individuals and thus i) either 38 
they are not affected by financial literacy or ii) financial literacy is the same for all individuals irrespectively 39 
of wage. In section 6 instead, we model directly the relationship between information costs and (endogenous) 40 
financial literacy, allowing individuals to acquire financial literacy to reduce the information costs. 41 
 42 
This said, eqs. (5a)-(5c) for the risky plan become: 43 
 44 
                                                 
10 In this case the optimal levels of consumption and the indirect utility do not depend on the contribution rate because individuals 
can borrow at the risk free rate. 
11 Note that while the magnitude of these costs may depend on income, it does not depend on the actual amount saved nor by the 
contribution rate; that is, once the cost has been paid, the amount invested in the pension fund does not affect it. 
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where  7 
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 10 
3.3. Incentive function for the adhesion to the risky plan 11 
 12 
We now have all the ingredients to compare the expected indirect utilities stemming from the two plans. 13 
If we define the incentive to adhere to the risky plan as    ** SR UEUEI   then the value of I determines the 14 
choice of the individuals: in fact a worker will opt for the risky plan whenever 0I  and for the safe plan for 15 
0I 12. We can easily compute the value of I from eqs. (7c) and (8c): 16 
 17 
      xx
x
x
x
R awwad
SR xeexUUEI






  1
1
1111  .      (10) 18 
 19 
The above result allows us to provide the following proposition: 20 
 21 
PROPOSITION 1 22 
A worker chooses the risky plan if and only if 0Rd . 23 
PROOF  24 
The maximization of expected utility implies that a worker chooses to adhere to the risky plan if and only if 25 
0I and thus, from eq. (10), a worker adheres to it if and only if      011 1
1
11  
 xx
x
x
x
R awwad xeex  . 26 
Since the parameters a, w, x and  are necessarily positive this inequality holds true for   01   wadRe  27 
which is true if and only if 0Rd . ■ 28 
 29 
Proposition 1 states that the choice of workers depends only on Rd  and therefore we can study the 30 
determinants of the choice simply analysing the variable Rd . Clearly it follows that for 0Rd individuals opt 31 
for the safe plan. More in particular, the following condition determines the choices of workers: 32 
 33 
  000 /2
2
22


FwwdI
x
xfrr
x
a
R
s   .      (11) 34 
 35 
Moreover we can assert the following remark which qualifies the shape of the incentive function: 36 
 37 
REMARK 1 TO PROPOSITION 1 38 
For any 0 , Rd  is an increasing function of srr   and a decreasing function of  a ,
2 , f and F . 39 
PROOF  40 
By computing the derivatives of Rd  (as defined by eq. (9)) with respect to the relevant parameters we have: 41 
  0//  xrrd sR  ; 02//
22  xwadR  ; 02//
22  xwadR  ; 01/  fdR and 42 
0/1/  wFdR .■ 43 
                                                 
12 By convention, we assume that for I=0 the individuals choose the safe scheme. 
 9 
 1 
The results contained in the above remark are quite intuitive: they state that workers are more likely to 2 
opt for the risky scheme when the difference between the mean returns of the risky and of the safe scheme is 3 
higher, and less likely the more adverse to risk the individuals, the more volatile the returns of the risky 4 
scheme and the larger the costs to access the risky scheme. Note that the results in Remark 1 can be extended 5 
to the incentive function as a whole so that the value of I is increasing in srr   and decreasing in a, 
2 , f, 6 
and F.  7 
Things are more complex as for the role that the wage w and the rate of compulsory contribution   have 8 
on the choice of workers: these aspects appear to be crucial in the choice process and a detailed analysis of 9 
their role will be at the centre of the next two sections. 10 
 11 
 12 
4. The role of wages 13 
 14 
A relevant element affecting the value of Rd  is the wage w, so that workers of different wage levels may 15 
prefer different plans: this in turn may imply a partition of the population where only some categories of 16 
workers opt for the risky plan while others opt for the safe asset only. In particular w does not affect 17 
monotonically Rd  and in fact, as we can see from eq. (11), the sign of Rd  is determined by a second order 18 
equation in w. This allows us to state the following proposition:  19 
 20 
PROPOSITION 2 21 
There exist two values of wages, w1 and w2, for which Rd =0. Then, for any 0 , for wage levels within the 22 
interval  21,ww  workers choose the risky plan and for wage levels outside the interval workers choose the 23 
safe plan. 24 
PROOF  25 
We know from Proposition 1 that workers choose the risky plan if and only if 0Rd . From eq. (11) we see 26 
that the sign of Rd  is determined by a second order equation in w with negative second order coefficient: 27 
therefore there are two values of w for which 0Rd  and Rd  is positive for values of w that are outside the 28 
interval whose boundaries are the roots of eq. (11). ■ 29 
 30 
In particular w1 and w2 take the following values: 31 
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The above equations 13  imply that whenever Fxarr s
22   there exists a minimum rate of 34 
contribution (
MIN ) which is necessary and sufficient for w1 and w2 to exist and be positive: 35 
 36 
Fxarr
xfMIN
s
22 



 .          (13) 37 
 38 
On the contrary, when Fxarr s
22  , the incentive is negative for any level of wages and of the 39 
contribution rate. 40 
                                                 
13 The values w1 and w2 exist and are positive for:   Fxaxfrr s
22 2/    and 0/  xfrr s . When the former condition is not 
met the incentive cannot be positive for any level of wages, when the latter is not met, the incentive cannot be positive for any 
positive level of wages. These conditions have an economic interpretation: they tell us that in order for the risky scheme to be 
attractive, the difference between the mean returns of the two schemes has to make up for the costs due to the uncertainty of the risky 
scheme (which are related to a,  and 2 ) and to the entry costs requirements (which are related to F, f and x). 
 
 
 10 
A graph can be helpful to understand the role of wages in the choice of workers: in Figure 1 we draw a 1 
curve depicting 
Rd  as a function of w for a given contribution rate: when the curve is above zero, Rd  is 2 
positive and so is the incentive: workers choose the risky plan; symmetrically, when the curve is below zero 3 
workers opt for the safe plan. 4 
 5 
 6 
Figure 1: The incentive to adhere to the risky plan in relation to wages 7 
 8 
A relevant economic feature of our results is the following: there exists a minimum wage threshold (w1) 9 
below which workers do not choose to invest in the risky plan: the reason for this rests on the fact that when 10 
wages are low, the size of the investment ( w ) in the risky plan is too low to compensate the costs to obtain 11 
the required degree of information. As for the second wage threshold (w2) our analysis shows that above such 12 
level workers do not invest in the risky scheme either: in this case the reason relies on the fact that if the size 13 
of the investment is too high, the variance of expected consumption grows exponentially, producing a lower 14 
expected utility for risk averse individuals. 15 
Note that, from a social policy point of view, the exclusion of the low income class from the risky 16 
scheme might be problematic as it does not descend strictly from their preferences (as in the case of the high 17 
income class) but rather by the relatively too high cost necessary to obtain the required degree of information 18 
and financial knowledge to access the risky scheme, so that their freedom of choice is somehow constrained 19 
by their scarcity of resources. Moreover, since the result concerning high-level individuals is somehow ad 20 
odds with empirical evidence, we will discuss its robustness in section 6, where we remove the hypothesis of 21 
constant absolute risk aversion.  22 
In the next section we analyse the role of the contribution rate.  23 
 24 
 25 
5 The rate of compulsory contribution and its optimal level 26 
 27 
Previous section considered the value of the rate of contribution   as fixed at a certain level: here first 28 
we analyse how   affects the incentive function and then we examine what happens when   can be chosen 29 
optimally by a benevolent policy maker or by the very individuals. 30 
Preliminarily we should note from eq. (7) that the effect of   on Rd  is not monotonic. This said, some 31 
interesting results are obtained if we consider the effect of   conjunctly with w. In particular, starting from 32 
Proposition 2 we can see that eq. (12) defines two curves (described from the equations for w1 and w2) which 33 
determine the couples (w, ) for which Rd  (and thus I) is equal to zero: those curves determine also the 34 
regions in the (w, ) space for which workers adhere to the risky plan and their shapes differ depending on 35 
whether 0f or 0f . We depict the curves14 for the two cases in Figures 2a and 2b. 36 
                                                 
14 Note that the two curves go to zero for  . In addition, for 0f , the two curves cross at MIN   and w1 is monotonically 
decreasing while w2 has a maximum. The formal analysis of the shapes of these curves is available upon request to the authors.  
 11 
 1 
Figure 2: Sign of the incentive as a function of the contribution rate and wage 2 
 3 
For both cases, the area between the two curves pinpoints the values of   and w for which workers 4 
choose the risky plan while, on the contrary, outside those curves workers invest in the safe plan. Basically, 5 
in order to induce the adhesion to the risky plan the value of   should neither be too small nor too large. 6 
There is a clear economic interpretation to this result: on the one hand the compulsory rate of contribution 7 
cannot be too small, otherwise the resulting investment would be too small to cover the entry costs; on the 8 
other hand, a too large   would generate too high volatility in the returns, making the risky plan unattractive. 9 
Note that from eq. (13) we know that for 0f there exists a lower bound for the rate of contribution 10 
( MIN in Figure 2a) below which no worker opts for the risky plan: this is the main difference with the case 11 
of 0f .  12 
The above considerations suggest the existence of a level of compulsory contribution that, on the one 13 
hand, maximising the value of I, is optimal to promote the adhesion to the risky scheme and, on the other 14 
hand, directly maximises the expected utility of all individuals. This latter property is relevant in two cases: 15 
first, from a normative perspective, whenever the government has to set a contribution rate that should be 16 
socially optimal; second, whenever the individuals are given the possibility to actually choose how much to 17 
invest in the pension plan. In the next proposition we derive formally the existence and the level of such 18 
optimal  : 19 
 20 
PROPOSITION 3 21 
There exists a value 
* that maximises the expected utility of individuals. Such value maximises the value of 22 
Rd  and of I and is given by 2
*


aw
rr s . 23 
PROOF  24 
From eqs. (7c) and (8c) we know that  *SUE  is unaffected by  and that  *RUE  is an increasing function of 25 
Rd  and is only affected by   through Rd . Therefore,  *RUE  reaches its maximum with respect to   26 
whenever
Rd

 maxarg*  . Since 
x
awrr
R
sd
2
/



  it descends that 
2
*


aw
rr s . Since this value 27 
maximises  *RUE  and leaves unaffected  *SUE , it maximizes the utility of all individuals.■ 28 
 29 
Several comments to Proposition 3 are worth doing.  30 
 31 
First of all, it has relevant policy implications: in fact it allows us to determine the exact rate that a policy 32 
maker should set in the attempt to maximise the utility of workers. The optimal rate is decreasing in wages 33 
and total contribution takes the form of a flat contribution equal to 2a
rr s . 34 
 12 
 1 
Second, even if setting *   is optimal it does not necessarily induce individuals to adhere to the riskier 2 
plan: in fact, there are values of the parameters for which   0* Rd . In other words, while 
*  always 3 
succeeds in maximising Rd  and the expected utility, it does not guarantee the incentive I to be positive. In 4 
particular, it is easy to see from eq. (9) that 0*)( Rd  if and only if 5 
 6 
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  8 
This an important point because it stresses the fact that information costs directly affect the investment 9 
decisions: in fact, when the costs are zero, condition (14) is always satisfied and the optimal contribution rate 10 
would induce individuals to choose the risky plan. Finally, from the above condition we see that, for f>0, 11 
workers above a certain wage will necessarily choose the safe plan. Hence, we can conclude that even when 12 
the contribution rate is set at its optimal rate, workers whose wage is above a certain threshold choose the 13 
safe plan. The value wMAX of that threshold is  
fxa
rr
Fs 1
2
1
2
2



 


; for the case 0f  the value of this threshold 14 
goes to infinity so that it is not binding. 15 
 16 
Third, we should bear in mind that, for its very nature, the rate of compulsory contribution cannot be 17 
higher than 1 and therefore there could be situations for which a policy maker could not actually set *  : 18 
in those cases the contribution rate equal to 1 would be the second best solution.  19 
We can summarize our findings by depicting in a graph the optimal rate of compulsory contribution: in 20 
Figure 3 below we represent the curve * along with the curves15 w1 and w2 and the constraint 1 . 21 
 22 
Figure 3: The optimal rate of contribution and the incentive function 23 
 24 
From the pictures above, first, we can see that the 
*  locus is always above the w1 locus while it is 25 
always below w2 only for 0f . Second, we observe that below a certain wage (wMIN in the figure) only a   26 
above 1 would induce a worker to choose the risky plan. This value of wages (which is obtained inserting 27 
1  in the equation of w1) defines a threshold: workers whose wage is below wMIN will not opt for the risky 28 
plan even with the adoption of an adequate (feasible) rate of compulsory contribution. Hence we can 29 
summarize our finding in the following: 30 
 31 
                                                 
15 Note that the curve *  is necessarily above curve w1 and, for 0f , it meets curve w2 at its vertex. Moreover both curves are 
drawn under the assumption that   F
xa
rr s 

2
2
22
1

 because, when this condition is not met, the problem becomes trivial and the incentive 
I is always negative.  
 13 
REMARK 1 TO PROPOSITION 3 1 
For workers below a certain wage, no feasible contribution rate can induce individuals to adhere to the risky 2 
plan. The value wMIN of that threshold is 
 
2
22 2


a
Fxaxfrrxfrr ss  . 3 
 4 
We can note an asymmetry with respect to higher threshold wMAX: in fact, differently from the higher 5 
threshold wMAX  the lower threshold wMIN  does not disappear in the case 0f .  6 
This far we have discussed the optimal contribution rate from a normative point of view but, as we stated 7 
at the beginning of the section, the optimal rate we obtain in Proposition 3 can also be considered the optimal 8 
rate that individuals would choose, other things being equal, if they were given the freedom to autonomously 9 
set the rate of contribution to pension plans16. Here we do not want to enter the discussion on whether the 10 
centralized or decentralized solution is preferable but, in any case, we have to stress that from a positive 11 
point of view, most pension systems entail a compulsory rate chosen at the central level so that the analysis 12 
of a centrally chosen rate is particularly relevant. On the other hand, however, the analysis of the possibility 13 
that individuals are given the freedom to autonomously set the rate of contribution to pension plans is useful 14 
to explore some further properties of our model. In fact, in this latter case, we can exploit Proposition 3 to 15 
extend our model to the possibility that individuals can also choose to mix between the safe and risky 16 
scheme: in this sense, for 0*)( Rd , 
*  becomes the optimal share of wage to be invested in the risky 17 
scheme while the rest of savings is diverted to the safe option. From this point of view our result is similar to 18 
optimal weight given to the risky asset in standard portfolio choice problem and is comparable to the one 19 
obtained, in a saving-for-retirement context, in Dutta et al. (2000) with two important differences: first, our 20 
result is obtained allowing for individuals to choose endogenously the amount to save and to consume and 21 
second, the actual optimal share of wage to invest in the risky asset is either 0 (for 0*)( Rd , that is for 22 
MAXww  and MINww ) or 
* (for 0*)( Rd , that is for 
MAX
MIN www  ). This second aspect is particularly 23 
important and is strictly due to the presence of information costs, in that such costs contribute in the 24 
determination of the mix between the different investments (since 
Rd  depends on f and F). 25 
 26 
 27 
6. An extended model: decreasing risk Aversion and endogenous financial Literacy 28 
We enrich now our analysis by exploring the possibility that risk aversion is decreasing in income and 29 
that financial literacy of individuals is endogenously chosen17. In what follows we focus mainly on the case 30 
0f  because, when f is equal to zero the results remain qualitatively the same as in the previous sections. 31 
 32 
6.1 Decreasing risk aversion 33 
The analysis we built in previous sections adopted a CARA utility function. This implies that 34 
individuals’ risk aversion does not depend on individuals’ income or wealth. This assumption has been 35 
challenged by a number of empirical works (see for example Vissing-Jorgensen 2002). To reconcile our 36 
theoretical model with this empirical evidence we adopt now the approach suggested by Makarov and 37 
Schornick (2010) which consists in directly making the absolute-risk aversion parameter wealth-dependent. 38 
This approach allows us to maintain the CARA utility function which is necessary to keep the problem 39 
analytically tractable and to reconcile our findings with the evidence of empirical works.  40 
We proceed then to assume the existence of a clean-cut negative relationship between wage and the 41 
absolute risk aversion coefficient: this implies that wealthier individuals display lower absolute risk aversion 42 
(a feature that is thus common with the CRRA setup). In particular we assume that the exact relationship is 43 
given by 44 
 45 
 wka             (15) 46 
 47 
                                                 
16 However, we should stress that the decentralized solution would not necessarily be socially optimal, as it could entail, for example, 
extra costs associated with moral hazard behaviour and a likely increase in the costs related to the higher degree of complexity of the 
decision on the optimal rate of contribution that individuals would face in this case. 
17 The development of this latter aspect was suggested by a referee: we are grateful for this useful suggestion.  
 14 
where 0  is a parameter that measures the elasticity of the risk aversion parameter with respect to income 1 
and 0k is simply a scale factor. In particular, for any 0 , we observe decreasing absolute risk aversion 2 
with respect to income, so that this formulation allows us to treat what is considered to be the most realistic 3 
case18. Similarly,   determines the behaviour of relative risk aversion with respect to income: relative risk 4 
aversion is increasing for 10  , constant for 1  and decreasing for 1 . Note that for 0  we 5 
have ka   so that risk aversion and income are unrelated and, thus, we obtain the case we treated in 6 
previous sections. Although we provide here a general analysis, non-decreasing relative risk aversion is 7 
probably the most realistic assumption and, consequently, 1  describes the most realistic case. 8 
 9 
6.2 Endogenous financial literacy 10 
The other aspect we want to explore in more details concerns the nature of the information costs to 11 
participate to the more complex plan R. In fact those costs should depend on the individuals’ degree of 12 
knowledge in the finance field, something which is usually called financial literacy. Moreover, it is possible 13 
that individuals can directly invest in the formation of financial literacy so that the degree of knowledge is 14 
optimally chosen to abate the costs in question. In other words, the level of financial literacy and the costs to 15 
access to the plan R can be considered endogenous. We will see that these new assumptions will allow to 16 
increase the degree of realism of our model and to obtain results that are more in line with empirical 17 
evidence, although at the cost higher formal complexity. 18 
To include these aspects within our model, we imagine that during the first period individuals can make 19 
an investment to acquire financial literacy and that the level of literacy acquired reduces the costs to access 20 
the more complex plan R. We assume that individuals that invest a real amount T obtain financial literacy L 21 
according to following production function: 22 
 23 
TL              (16) 24 
 25 
where 1  is the elasticity of financial literacy with respect to investment. 26 
The acquisition of an amount L of financial literacy reduces the costs to access the complex plan R and in 27 
particular we assume that information costs CR are now described by 28 
 29 
L
fwF
CR

 .           (17) 30 
 31 
The cost to access plan R is still made up by a fixed cost F and by an opportunity cost fw but they are 32 
reduced by the amount of financial literacy L. Within this framework, an individual that chooses the plan R 33 
has to pay the above cost plus the (desired) amount invested to obtain financial literacy. Exploiting eqs. (16) 34 
and (17) we obtain the total cost DR to enter plan R: 35 
 36 
T
T
fwF
DR 



.           (18) 37 
 38 
In addition, we allow T to be chosen optimally. In practice, individuals invest in the acquisition of 39 
financial literacy the optimal amount 
*T  (which implies an optimal amount of literacy *L ) that minimizes 40 
the above cost, therefore: 41 
 42 





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
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T
fwF
T
T

minarg* .          (19) 43 
 44 
Solving the above we obtain the optimal level of literacy:  45 
 46 
  fwFL    

1*           (20) 47 
 48 
                                                 
18 See for example Mas-Colell et al. (1995), chapter 6. 
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which is an increasing function of wage. Given eq. (20), the actual total cost to access plan R is now given by 1 
 2 
 fwF
RD   1
1
*           (21) 3 
where 

  

  11
1
 and where *RD  is the actual total cost to access plan R when financial literacy is 4 
optimally chosen. 5 
We have to stress that, within this framework, the acquisition of *L  only takes place if individuals end up 6 
choosing the risky plan R. On the contrary, if the safe plan is preferred, no investment in literacy is required 7 
and *L  becomes zero. From this point of view we could interpret *L  as the acquisition of literacy that is 8 
incremental to some basic knowledge that individuals have. Therefore, we are not actually suggesting that 9 
individuals that choose the safe plan have necessarily zero literacy but, rather, that they do not acquire any 10 
extra literacy on top of their starting endowment. 11 
 12 
6.3 The determinants of the choice       13 
These new assumptions do not change the framework of our analysis but they affect some of the results. 14 
In particular eq. (10) is still correct and thus Proposition 1 is still true (so that workers still opt for the risky 15 
plan whenever 0Rd ). However the costs to access plan R are now given by eq. (21) and, consequently, the 16 
equation for 
Rd  can now be written as 17 
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where 0

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x
rr s and 0
2/
22



x
k R . 19 
 20 
6.4 The role of wages 21 
The relationship between wage and the incentive to opt for the risky plan is now somehow different 22 
from the one described by eq. (9) and, starting from eq. (22), can be fully described by the following 23 
equations: 24 
 25 
0lim,
0
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R
w
d           (23) 26 
 27 
that is, for wages low enough, individuals do not opt for the risky plan; 28 
 29 
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 31 
that is, for 10  , for wages large enough, the incentive to opt for the risky plan is negative, while for 32 
1 , for wages large enough, the incentive to opt for the risky plan is positive. Furthermore, one gets (see 33 
Appendix B): 34 
 35 
wwdR   0/1           (25) 36 
 37 
that is, taking into account eqs. (23), (24) and (25) we have that, for 1 , the incentive starts negative 38 
and it increases monotonically until it eventually becomes positive. Basically, low income workers opt for 39 
the safe plan, but above a certain wage threshold, all workers choose the risky option. 40 
Some other, more complicated, properties can be also derived for 10  . In fact we obtain:  41 
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The proofs of (26) and (27) are provided in Appendix B. Considering (23), (24), (26) and (27) we have 2 
that, for 10   the incentive starts and ends negative and it has an inverted U-shape pattern (becoming 3 
positive at some point if and only if 0max R
w
d  ). 4 
We can summarize the above findings through the following proposition: 5 
 6 
PROPOSITION 4 7 
There exists an income threshold 1w below which no individual opts for the risky plan. Moreover: 8 
a) for 10   and 0max R
w
d , no individual chooses the risky plan; 9 
b) for 10   and 0max R
w
d , individuals whose wage w falls within the interval  21,ww  chooses 10 
the risky plan while the rest choose the safe plan; 11 
c) for 1 , individuals whose wage w is above  1w  choose the risky plan. 12 
 13 
The graph below describes the pattern of Rd  (and thus of the sign of the incentive) with respect to 14 
wages. 15 
 16 
Figure 4: The incentive to adhere to the risky plan in relation to wages 17 
 18 
 19 
To sum up, we can conclude that, for 10  , the relationship between wages and adhesion to the 20 
risky plan is qualitatively the same as the one we obtained in section 4. On the contrary when 1  things 21 
change dramatically, in that there exists a unique threshold 1w  above which individuals choose the safe plan. 22 
This is due to the fact that, when income increases, the decrease in risk aversion more than compensates the 23 
increase in volatility, so that the risky plan becomes more attractive. Endogenous literacy also has a role, de 24 
facto reducing the cost to access the risky plan and making the latter more attractive. More precisely, given 25 
the endogeneity of financial literacy, the cost to access the risky plan becomes relatively smaller for higher 26 
income individuals. 27 
 28 
6.5 The optimal contribution rate 29 
We examine now the relationship between the compulsory contribution rate and the incentive to opt for 30 
the risky plan. This analysis allows us also to derive the optimal contribution rate in a context where absolute 31 
risk aversion is decreasing in income and where financial literacy is endogenously determined.  32 
Since Proposition 1 still holds under these new assumptions, we know that decisions of individuals are 33 
determined by the sign of Rd . However, Rd  is now described by eq. (22) and thus we can exploit the latter 34 
equation to formulate a new proposition on the value of the optimal contribution rate: 35 
 17 
 1 
PROPOSITION 5 2 
There exists a value * which maximises the expected utility of individuals. Such value maximises the value 3 
of 
Rd  and of I and is given by 21
*





kw
rr s . 4 
 5 
We can also characterize the relationships between optimal rates and wages as follows: 6 
 7 
REMARK 1 TO PROPOSITION 5 8 
For 10  , the optimal contribution rate is decreasing in wages; for 1 , is increasing in wages; for 9 
1 , the optimal rate is the same for all wages. 10 
 11 
Differently from Proposition 3, the normative prescriptions do not imply a flat contribution, in that the 12 
optimal rate depends on the value of   and it is actually decreasing/constant/increasing depending on 13 
whether relative risk aversion is decreasing/constant/increasing respectively. 14 
Moreover, the optimal rate is not affected directly by the costs to access the risky scheme or by the costs 15 
to obtain financial literacy. However, it is important to stress that these costs, although not entering the 16 
formula of the optimal contribution rate, are crucial in determining whether, once contribution has been set at 17 
its optimal level, individuals will choose the safe or the risky scheme. 18 
Finally, we explore what happens to individuals’ choices when contribution rate is set at its optimal level. 19 
Inserting the optimal rate of contribution (from Proposition 5) in (22) we obtain 20 
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. 22 
According to eq. (28) we obtain a new relationship between the incentive to opt for the risky plan and the 23 
wage level. In particular, the characteristics of this relationship depend on the value of the parameter  and 24 
we can summarize them with the following proposition: 25 
 26 
PROPOSITION 6 27 
Once the compulsory contribution rate is set at its optimal rate, there exists an income threshold 28 
MINw below which no individual opts for the risky plan. Moreover, by defining 29 
  








 1
1
1
1
11 Ff  we have 30 
a) for    1/10  and 0 , no individual chooses the risky plan; 31 
b) for    1/10  and 0 , individuals whose income w falls within the interval  MAXMIN ww ,  32 
choose the risky plan while the rest choose the safe plan; 33 
c) for    1/1 , individuals whose wage is above MINw choose the risky plan. 34 
 35 
PROOF see Appendix C. 36 
 37 
In words, the above proposition states that  *Rd  can assume different patterns19 depending on the value of  38 
 and that, according to it, different partitions of the population emerge. However, for any value of  , even 39 
when the contribution rate is optimally set, there exists an income threshold below which individuals do not 40 
opt for the risky plan. The actual patterns of  *Rd  are analytically proved in Appendix C: in Figure 5, for 41 
illustrative purposes, we depict the different possible cases. The patterns drawn in the figure determine the 42 
sign of the incentive with respect to wages once the contribution rate has been set at its optimal level. 43 
 44 
                                                 
19 In Proposition 6 we assumed, for the sake of exposition, that 0 f . When this is not true the point-value    1/1  falls 
in case a) or case b) and the rest of the characterization remains exactly the same. 
 18 
 1 
Figure 5: The incentive to adhere to the risky plan in relation to wages and risk aversion when the contribution rate is set at 2 
its optimal level *  3 
 4 
Precisely, Figure 5a highlights how, for     1/10  when 0  no individual chooses the risky 5 
plan while, when 0 , individuals inside the interval ( MINw ,
MAXw ) opt for the risky plan while outside the 6 
interval they opt for the safe one. In this case, the parameter  determines the necessary conditions for the 7 
risky plan to be attractive for at least some wage level. Differently from this first case, as it is possible to see 8 
from Figure 5b and Figure 5c, for    1/1  there is a wage threshold MINw  above which individuals opt 9 
for the risky plan.  10 
These results clearly highlight the role that risk aversion has on the decision of high income individuals: 11 
the economic rationale behind the decision of this category of individuals rests in the fact that their higher 12 
income increases at the same time their risk tolerance and the volatility of their risky investment; therefore, 13 
they choose the risky plan if the former effect off-sets the latter. From this point of view, it is worth to stress 14 
that non-increasing relative risk aversion is the most realistic case and, therefore, we can conclude that the 15 
existence of a unique wage threshold ( MINw ) is the most realistic outcome. 16 
 17 
6.6 The role of financial literacy and information costs 18 
We conclude this section by commenting on the role that financial literacy and the costs to access the 19 
more complex investment plan have within our model. We can summarize our findings in four main points. 20 
First, within our framework the investment in financial literacy is made if and only if plan R is chosen: 21 
then, the actual level of literacy acquired is given by eq. (20) when 0Rd  and is zero otherwise. As 22 
specified above, such a finding can be interpreted by recalling that the optimal level of literacy *L  is 23 
incremental to some basic knowledge with which individuals are endowed. Consequently, our result does not 24 
imply necessarily that individuals that choose the safe plan have no financial literacy at all but, rather, that 25 
they do not find it convenient to invest in the acquisition of extra amount of literacy. 26 
Second, higher income individuals have higher financial literacy. This happens for two reasons: i) from 27 
eq. (20), we know that literacy is directly increasing in wages and this is due to the fact that literacy abates 28 
the opportunity costs component and thus, investing in literacy is more useful for higher income individuals; 29 
ii) in the most realistic cases (i.e.    1/1 ), higher income individuals are more likely to opt for the risky 30 
plan and, consequently, they are more likely to actually invest in literacy. A similar reasoning can be applied 31 
to the parameter that measures the returns of the investment in terms of literacy so that optimal literacy is 32 
increasing in  . 33 
Third, from eq. (22) we have that the cost parameters F and f strictly reduce, even in the presence of 34 
endogenous literacy, the value Rd  and thus they effectively influence the individuals’ investment decision. 35 
From this point of view, higher costs, other things equal, also increase the value MINw  and decreases the 36 
value MAXw  de facto reducing the share of population that opts for the risky plan. Moreover, even if the 37 
information costs do not affect the optimal rate of contribution
* , they still affect negatively )( *Rd  and, 38 
therefore, they are still fundamental in determining individuals’ choice even when contribution rate is 39 
optimally set. 40 
 19 
Fourth, the cost parameters F and f have a two-fold effect on literacy: on one side, from eq. (20) it 1 
follows that higher values of these costs induce larger investments in literacy because the effect of an extra 2 
unit of literacy in abating information costs is larger when these costs are particularly high; on the other hand, 3 
F and f reduce Rd  (and )(
*Rd ) making the risky plan less attractive and possibly preventing the whole 4 
investment in literacy. 5 
 6 
 7 
7. Conclusions 8 
 9 
In this paper we tackle the issue of retirement saving both from a positive and normative point of view. 10 
At the heart of this paper there is the study of the new trend according to which pension systems provide 11 
more freedom of choice for workers in terms of different portfolio options. The other side of the coin of such 12 
increased freedom to choose is higher individual responsibility and higher request/costs for information and 13 
financial literacy. 14 
Here we analyse the mechanisms behind the retirement saving choice, concerning both the amount and 15 
the investment decision, and we build a model able to represent this process and assess its determinants in 16 
presence of stochastic returns, information costs and financial literacy. More precisely, our analysis 17 
highlights how the choice is influenced, besides the economic attractiveness of the plans, by three relevant 18 
factors: 1) the level of wages; 2) the rate of the mandatory contribution; 3) risk aversion. In particular we 19 
show that at the aggregate level it may emerge a partition of the population in adhesions to riskier pension 20 
plans that is based on the income level of workers. From this point of view, the fact that information costs 21 
prevent low-income individuals from acquiring information, financial literacy and, consequently, from 22 
adhering to riskier schemes emerges as a robust result. As for higher income individuals, we show that the 23 
incentive function to diversify the investment for retirement savings depends crucially on risk aversion, and 24 
in particular non-increasing relative risk aversion is sufficient to obtain results that are in line with 25 
consolidated empirical findings, according to which higher income individuals invest relatively more in risky 26 
assets. 27 
As for the contribution rate, we prove the existence of a socially optimal value and we show that it is 28 
shaped, among other things, by the exact relationship between income and risk aversion. These results are 29 
robust even in that they emerge even in the presence of endogenous financial literacy. 30 
Finally, some policy implications can be drawn from our analysis. In fact, our model suggests that the 31 
choice of individuals may be driven not only by their personal preferences (i.e. risk aversion) but also by 32 
their income level and by the lack of financial literacy. Since these latter elements may reduce the freedom of 33 
choice, a benevolent authority might desire to intervene to remove or mitigate those barriers that appear to 34 
burden in particular low income individuals. 35 
Clearly, the setting of an optimal rate of contribution is a first step in this direction but we also showed 36 
that even in this case individuals’ endowments can affect the possibility to diversify retirement-savings 37 
portfolio, in that the barrier generated by the need to pay information costs to assess riskier assets is in 38 
general insurmountable for low-income workers. 39 
Thus, if authorities aim at promoting freedom of choice for all workers, a more direct intervention is 40 
needed. According to our model this would imply actions that affect the wage thresholds, which can be 41 
achieved through at least three possible actions: 1) fiscal incentives for workers opting for the risky scheme; 42 
2) a lump sum benefit for workers opting for the risky scheme; 3) information campaigns and/or campaigns 43 
aimed at increasing financial literacy. These three actions could actually be implemented either for all 44 
workers or only for those categories that are in the need of incentives to adhere: clearly the latter solution 45 
requires fewer resources but might involve some drawbacks in terms of the fairness of the intervention and 46 
of the fact that it may be difficult to restrict the intervention only to those that actually need it. 47 
 48 
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APPENDIX A 18 
The optimal consumption in period 1 and period 2 is obtained solving the following maximization 19 
problem: 20 
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The above can be written as 22 
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and consequently, the optimal value of consumption 
*
,1 ic  is the value of 1c for which 24 
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 27 
Eq. (A3) implies 28 
 29 
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 31 
or, equivalently  32 
 33 
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 35 
where  rx  1 . Before to proceed, through algebraic manipulation it is easy to see that 36 
 37 
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Therefore, if we define
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 , we can insert (A6) into (A5) to obtain 40 
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 43 
Solving the above with respect to c1 we have (taking logs of both sides of the equation): 44 
 22 
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that finally delivers: 4 
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 7 
Once obtained the above, it is easy to compute also the value *,2 ic  and  *iUE  inserting eq. (A9) into eqs. 8 
(1) and (3) respectively. ■ 9 
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APPENDIX B 15 
We want to prove here the following points: 16 
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Preliminarily we define: 21 
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From equation (22) we know that 
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Proof of Point i.  28 
For 1 , the first addend of eq. (B3) in non-negative and the second, given (B2), is positive: then, 29 
0/  wdR .■ 30 
 31 
Proof of Point ii.  32 
We can rearrange equation (B3) as 33 
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and combining the above with eqs. (B1) and (B2) we obtain: 35 
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and rearranging the above 38 
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which, for 0w and 10  , is strictly positive. ■ 2 
 3 
 4 
Proof of Point iii.  5 
Preliminarily we define 6 
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Note that from (B2) we have   0wb . 8 
Exploiting eq. (B1) and (B2) we can rearrange (B5) as 9 
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and, going through computation we obtain 12 
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which finally yields 14 
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Given that   f
w
F
 1 , 1w  and   

 

 1wf  are positive and decreasing in w, from eq. (B5c) we have: 16 
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.            B6) 17 
We also define 18 
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Note that     wwbwwh  //  and thus, for 1 : 20 
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.            B8) 21 
Combining eq. (B4) and eq. (B7) we have 22 
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wwh
w
dR            B9) 23 
and thus: 24 
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From (B9) we necessarily have that  wh
w
dR 


0  and from (B6) we have that, for 1 , 
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wh
: 26 
therefore (B10) implies that 00,10
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




w
d
w
d RR .■ 27 
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 29 
APPENDIX C 30 
To prove Proposition 6 we prove here that: 31 
 32 
LEMMA 1. The following holds true: 33 
i)   0lim *
0


R
w
d . 34 
 24 
 1 
LEMMA 2. 1  the following holds true: 2 
i)   0lim * 

R
w
d         3 
ii)   0/* wdR  . 4 
LEMMA 3.   11/1    the following holds true: 5 
i)     *0,,0 RdMwM  6 
ii)      0/0 **  wdd RR   7 
LEMMA 4.    1/10  the following holds true: 8 
i)   0:,,0 *   RdMwM  9 
ii)   00: *  dw  10 
iii)For 0 ,   0* Rd for two and only two values of w. 11 
 12 
and we than show how the above lemmas prove Proposition 6.       13 
   14 
 15 
 16 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1.  17 
We can rearrange eq. (22) as 18 
    11
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  wwd fwFR
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from which we easily obtain   

*
0
lim R
w
d .■ 20 
 21 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2.  22 
We can rearrange eq. (22) as 23 
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F
wdR 1
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from which, for 1 , we easily obtain   0lim * 

R
w
d .■ 25 
Consider eq. (C2): for 1 it is easy to see that 1 w  is non-decreasing in w and that 26 

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 

w
f
w
F
1
1
1
is strictly increasing in w. Then,   0/* wdR  . ■ 27 
 28 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.  29 
We can rearrange eq. (22) as  30 
      1
1
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* 111 
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 wd fwFwR .      C3) 31 
Consider the above equation. For   11/1   , it is easy to see that: 32 
  0lim * 

R
w
d             C4) 33 
and that (for 0 f ): 34 
 25 
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Obviously we have  2 
0:, 1  wMwM            C6) 3 
and, from (C5) we have 4 
   
0:,
111 1
1











 




 
 
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Given eq. (C3), from (C4), (C5) and (C7) we necessarily have     *0,,0 RdMwM .■ 6 
We now define  7 
    wwm fwF 1
1
)(            C8) 8 
and, consequently, we can rewrite eq. (22) as: 9 
     1*   wwmdR .          C9) 10 
From definition (C8) we have: 11 
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so that 13 
    0/,11/1  wwm .         C11) 14 
Given equation (C9) we have 15 
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From equation (C9) we also know that      00*  wmdR   and combining this with (C11) and 17 
(C12), we necessarily have that,   11/1   ,      0/0 **  wdd RR  .■ 18 
 19 
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.  20 
Consider eq. (C2): for    1/10 , it is easy to see that 21 
  0lim * 
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w
d             C13) 22 
Moreover, for    1/10 : 23 
   
0lim
111 1
1











 




 


 
fwFw
w
.       C14) 24 
From (C14) we have 25 
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Given (C3), from (C5), (C13) and (C15) we necessarily have   0,,0 *   RdMwM .■ 27 
 28 
We define now  29 
      wwn fwF 1
1
.          C16) 30 
Given eq. (28) we have that 31 
    00*  wndR              C17) 32 
 26 
and 1 
    00*  wndR  .                      C17a) 2 
Clearly,  wn  can be positive if and only if   0max wn
w
. We can thus compute this latter maximum and 3 
obtain: 4 
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From (C18) we have that  6 
  00:  wnw            C19) 7 
and considering (C17) and (C19) we have that   00: *  dw .■ 8 
Given definition (C16) we have 9 
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Consider now the case 0 . From (C16) we have: 11 
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Given eq. (C21), the derivative of  wn  is increasing for  
 




11
1
f
F
w and decreasing thereafter: 13 
combining this result with (C19) and (C20) we necessarily have that, for 0 ,  wn  is zero for two and 14 
only two values of w and then, from (C17a),  *d  is zero for two and only two values of w. ■ 15 
 16 
 17 
PROOF of PROPOSITION 6 18 
From Lemma 1, when wage w is below a certain threshold, we necessarily have   0* Rd . ■ 19 
From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, for    1/1 , when wage w is above a certain threshold, we necessarily 20 
have   0* Rd . ■ 21 
From Lemma 4, for     1/10  and 0 , we necessarily have   0* Rd .■ 22 
From Lemma 4, for     1/10  and 0 , there exists two values MINw  and
MAXw  for which, when 23 
wage w falls within the interval ( MINw ,
MAXw )  we have   0* Rd  and when w falls outside that interval we 24 
have   0* Rd .■ 25 
